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This is not an impression inflated by social media. It is a measured, documented campaign: from January 2025 to May 2026, analysts recorded 244 thousand publications on Telegram, X, Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok, which together generated over 1.39 billion views — and 2,680 sources of this content showed signs of coordinated, inauthentic activity. This is not an estimate based on rumors. It is the conclusion of an official report by the European External Action Service and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, published on June 24, 2026.
The number itself means little until you see what it consists of.
On August 3, 2026 — just a few days ago — the Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications recorded two separate episodes of the same campaign in real time. First: Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service issued a statement about the alleged lack of prospects for Ukraine’s European integration and accused the European Union of “stoking war”. Within a few days, monitoring recorded over 750 instances of this statement being spread across 510 resources, targeting audiences in Russia, the USA, European countries, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East — the campaign covered 20 languages. The dissemination involved media resources of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Sputnik and RT networks, Russian state and private media, Telegram channels, as well as the “Pravda” (Pravda/ZOV) network and propagandist bloggers. This is already the second such wave this summer — the previous SVR statement was spread on June 19, immediately after the opening of the “Fundamentals” negotiation cluster concerning Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
The second episode of the same day: starting August 3, the main narrative theme of pro-Russian networks became the claim of a supposed “terrorist Ukraine” — it appeared in 1,400 pieces of content within 24 hours, meaning in every fifth disinformation publication of the day. To promote it, stories were used about victims on a beach near Gelendzhik, events in the Belgorod region, in Crimea, in Enerhodar, and about injured Turkish sailors — at the same time, propagandists completely ignored the possible role of Russian air defense in shooting down a drone that same day, as well as Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities. 93.3% of all these publications were generated by a single network — the Kombat Portal, also known as “Pravda” — the highest rate for the entire observation period of the Center.

The EEAS report gives a direct answer, and it is an unpleasant one: “Poland stands out as a country particularly susceptible to content concerning Ukrainian refugees. They are often accused of criminal and dangerous behavior” — a quote taken directly from the report. This is neither a coincidence nor a side effect — it is a deliberate choice of target.
The mechanism in a concrete example: EEAS analysts describe a Telegram post featuring a map of Europe and a fabricated story about the head of the Volhynian branch of the Polish Teachers’ Union, who allegedly was preparing the local population to detach Volhynia from Ukraine as “Polish territory”. No such person or statement ever existed — the map and text were created from scratch, deliberately exploiting the painful topic of Volhynia for Poles.
At the same time, a subtler tool is at work — quotes from real politicians, officials, and experts taken out of context. The report states this plainly: individual quotes are stripped of context to suggest that Ukraine has no prospects of EU membership, that the West is tired of supporting Ukraine, or that there are hidden contradictions between Kyiv and its European partners.
“These actions are neither isolated nor accidental. They are deliberate, coordinated, and persistent. Their aim is to exploit concerns related to corruption, security, identity, and economic costs (…) Russia’s actions reveal an important truth: the Kremlin fears Ukraine’s success” — Kaja Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and head of EU diplomacy, from the EEAS report, June 2026.
Another layer of this picture is the Polish segment. Bronisław Geremek Foundation and the fact-checking team “Keyboard Warriors” monitored Polish-language social media daily for half a year (April–September 2025) and concluded: the main driving force behind anti-Ukrainian disinformation and hate speech are bots, followed by politicians, and to a lesser extent — journalists. The researchers identified four main themes of manipulation: alleged “privileges” for Ukrainians in Poland, accusations of welfare abuse, supposed epidemiological and terrorist threats from Ukrainians, and hate speech itself.
The key conclusion of the Geremek Foundation almost literally совпides with the EEAS report: a significant portion of these narratives overlaps with what Russian propaganda channels spread — this is not a parallel, independent Polish phenomenon, but part of a coordinated international campaign adapted to the local context.
The logic is simple and cynical: a real fear is taken — about jobs, about children’s safety, about identity — and amplified by a network of accounts, most of which do not belong to real people. That is what makes this campaign so potent: the outrage it provokes is entirely genuine. Only the source of that outrage is fabricated.
2,680 sources, 20 languages, 93.3% from a single network within one day — this is no longer spontaneous hostility between neighbors. This is an industry with a budget, a schedule, and a goal.
Source: Nowiny Wschodnie / rp.pl (PAP) / European External Action Service / Centre for Countering Disinformation / Strategic Communications Center (Spravdi) / Bronisław Geremek Foundation