The text is in the form of a column, expresses the author’s personal opinion, and does not represent the editorial board’s position on this topic
Midterm elections in the United States usually have the status of a curiosity in Poland: this is how, as a rule, two years after electing a president, Americans check whether they still trust him. This year, however, for Kyiv it is not a mood poll, but a decision on whether the U.S. aid to Ukraine—so important at this critical moment—will remain in the hands of the American president, Donald Trump. The data and the political reality of this country point to a bitter truth—every possible outcome of these elections leaves Ukraine in the hands of one man.
Scenario 1: Republicans retain Congress and Donald Trump’s dominance
Let us start with the scenario in which Republicans retain control of Congress. Although this scenario contradicts the forecasts of most polling aggregators, specific campaign and financial mechanisms are at play here. The administration and the committees supporting it directed record funds to ads in key swing districts. Ukraine has no reason to expect that the safety of its citizens depends on Congress’s ability to act independently. The institution that, under the country’s Constitution, is supposed to have that independence has, from the very beginning of Trump’s second term, behaved like an extension of the president’s office. The past few weeks are the best proof.
Donald Trump signed the so-called Graham Act on 18 September. It provided for tariffs of up to 100% on the main importers of Russian oil and gas and was passed by the Senate on 7 August 2026 by an official vote of 86 to 11. However, like many similar laws, it included a clause giving the president the right to suspend the application of its provisions for reasons of national security (a waiver). Less than a month later, on 16 October, he used that authority, issuing an order suspending the key restrictions on Russia contained in this specific act. Although this decision does not abolish the entire existing system of U.S. sanctions, it shows Congress’s limited influence over the practical application of the new law. The justification? He had earlier announced an agreement on imports of Russian diesel that was supposed to lower fuel prices in the U.S., and the White House argued that enforcing the sanctions could hamper peace negotiations.
A law passed almost unanimously by the nation’s elected representatives is suspended with a single signature, and Congress’s response is outrage without legal or institutional consequences. It is already clear that Trump’s decision did not bring positive economic effects – fuel prices at home have remained high or even increased. The fact that fuel prices did not fall immediately after the October 16 decision is not, in itself, hard evidence of the executive’s impure intentions. Still, it is worth reading it as an analytical interpretation: for the White House, this regulation was primarily geopolitical and transactional in nature. It was an attempt to maintain negotiating flexibility toward Moscow and to meet the expectations of part of the refining sector, even if the direct price effect for the American consumer proved negligible. This is the moment when Congress’s legislative agency gives way to the executive’s transactional politics, and it aptly captures the essence of American politics in recent years.
This does not mean that there are no rebels in the Republican camp. On June 4, 2026, eighteen Republican members broke ranks and, together with Democrats, voted to pass the Ukraine Support Act (H.R. 2913), adopted by a vote of 226 to 195. However, one must distinguish between the legal authorization passed by the House (authorization to allocate funds) and the actual appropriation (allocation of funds in the budget), as well as the physical delivery of aid to the front, which ultimately depends on executive decisions by the White House and the bill’s progress in the Senate. This is not, however, a move on which a strategy can be built. It is rather a handful of people who allow themselves to break ranks as long as it does not threaten their careers. When candidates have to return to their districts and the president hands out blessings—and withdraws them for disobedience—such cracks close up on their own.
So if Republicans hold the House and the Senate, Ukraine will get another two years of a Congress that, at best, does not get in the way, and at worst, sticks with a president who wants to return to business as usual with Russia. For Trump, Russia is above all a trading partner and a source of cheaper fuel that can be sold to voters before the next election. In this logic, Ukraine is a difficult burden—one that can be cut loose as soon as the topic becomes too inconvenient for Trump.
Scenario 2: the Democrats’ “blue wave” and the risk of a constitutional crisis
However, the numbers and historical voting trends point to a “blue wave” victory for the Democrats. In that case, it seems we have a window of opportunity. Various polls (including Decision Desk HQ from late October 2026) give Democrats a 84% to 90% chance of taking the majority. The projected advantage averages between 239 and 241 seats (the majority threshold is 218). Regaining the House would mean the return of committees, hearings, and the ability to block the president’s budget priorities, as well as a chance to pass new aid at a faster pace, bypassing the will of the White House. And yet the recent years’ history teaches that in American politics nothing is as dangerous as a man who has something taken away from him.
Experts from the liberal Center for American Progress (CAP) point out the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the results themselves in the event of an outcome unfavorable to the governing camp – from pressure on local election boards to motions to invalidate votes in key districts. However, it should be remembered that at this stage these are forecast scenarios and journalistic assessments, not facts that have already occurred.
However, it is enough to adopt Trump’s own perspective for a moment. For him, a Democratic House does not mean a routine change in the balance of power. It means investigations, subpoenas, documents and, very likely, a new impeachment. And that, in turn, means having to defend himself against something that, for a man so sensitive about his image, is a political and personal humiliation. This is pointed out by various American commentators, including However, it is worth emphasizing the systemic difference: passing impeachment in the House of Representatives (by a simple majority) is a form of political indictment and an image blow, but it does not mean the president is automatically removed from office – for that, a Senate verdict by a 2/3 majority is required. In such a situation, in a man who for years has built his position on the thesis that elections are either won or stolen, impulses may awaken that cannot be reduced to routine politics.
And here we come to a paradox that should worry the Polish reader as well. A Democratic victory, in which many of us place hope for unblocking aid to Ukraine, may in the first instance trigger a constitutional crisis in the United States itself. And a constitutional crisis in a superpower has its own gravity: it absorbs attention, limits the ability to act, and turns everything else into secondary matters. Ukraine, which needs constant help at a fast pace, cannot count on a state in such a situation.
Scenario 3: A divided Congress
However, there is still a third scenario: Democrats’ chances of taking or maintaining control of the Senate, according to the Cook Political Report polling (October 2026), are estimated at around 64%. The outcome is decided by only a few key races in swing states (this time including Ohio, Colorado, and Texas), where the differences are within the margin of error (1.5–3 pp). A divided Congress is a highly complicated scenario for supporting Kyiv, causing systemic legislative paralysis.
A Democrat-controlled House of Representatives can pass bills authorizing multi-billion-dollar packages of weapons and funding, but the budget bill requires approval from both chambers. If a Republican Senate blocks the legislative process, the aid will get stuck in a so-called legislative limbo. In the absence of consensus in Congress, the White House regains full control over foreign policy. The president can then use the dispute between the chambers as a pretext for not taking initiatives or can use executive waivers without fear that a bicameral majority will overturn his decision. As a result, a divided-Congress scenario does not mean an immediate cut-off of funds, but it drastically slows the pace at which they are allocated, forcing Kyiv to operate under conditions of constant uncertainty.
What must Europe do?
So we have three scenarios, none of which is good. In the first and third, Trump wins comfortably, and Ukraine is left with a U.S. president who treats it as a cost. In the second, Trump loses, but the fight over whether and how to accept that loss may consume all Americans’ attention. There is nothing here that could be called optimism, and there is no point pretending that there is.
This does not mean, however, that we are allowed to fall into fatalism. Quite the opposite. If the U.S. Congress turns out to be so susceptible to a single person, then European capitals, with Warsaw at the forefront, must stop treating aid to Ukraine as an issue that will be “taken care of” in Washington at the end of the day. It won’t be taken care of. It is we who will have to build that part of security that we would prefer to leave to someone else.
After 3 November, some will celebrate, others will accuse. And Ukraine will be counting days and missiles ahead of a difficult winter, which may be even more difficult because of what is happening on the other side of the ocean.
President of the Management Board of the “Ukrainian Youth Alliance ‘24 August’ (24/08)” Foundation and coordinator of the “Hate Observatory” project. A PhD candidate in Political Science and Public Administration at SWPS University, where he researches the impact of conspiracy narratives on national security policy. Programme Director of SWPS PL LAB.
Since 2023, he has worked as an analyst with Detector Media, a leading Ukrainian media research organisation. He holds two master’s degrees: one in Journalism and Social Communication from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), and another in Interdisciplinary European Studies from the College of Europe in Natolin.
He is an expert at the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, with which he conducts training sessions for school students in smaller Polish towns on countering disinformation about the European Union.
He is the author of numerous analyses, articles, media commentaries and academic publications focusing on Russian disinformation in Europe and North America, as well as US politics.
In 2023, during an internship at the Parliament of Canada, he contributed to the development of parliamentary motion M-102, “Countering disinformation in Canada and around the world”.
He is a recipient of the Young Diplomat Award 2023 and received a distinction at Young Experts Day 2025 for his research on Russian disinformation. He is a member of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the WestBalkanNet youth network.
What do you think about this story?
Join the conversation. Please keep comments relevant to the article.
Write a comment